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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Utah Court of Appeals exercises jurisdiction overt this
matter pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2) (h), Utah Code, as amended
and Section 780-45-10, Utah Code Ann.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Set forth in Appellant's Brief and not required in
Appellee's Brief.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Pursuant to Rule 24 (6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, the statutory provisions are Utah Code Ann. § 78-457.15 and they are attached in the Addendum of this Brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The parties were divorced and the Decree of Divorce was
entered in Fourth District Court on February 27, 1996. The
parties' Decree of Divorce, at paragraph 10 required the
Appellant to be responsible for one-half of a n non-routine
medical and dental expenses for the minor children. (See court
record at page 56.)
Appellee set the matter for an Order to Show Cause Hearing
on June 29, 2001, before Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr.
2

The Appellant

was personally served with the Order to Show Cause, Affidavit in
Support and Motion and the proof of personal service was filed
with the court.

(See Court record at page 113.)

The Affidavit of the Appellee asked for the Appellant to pay
his share of the medical and dental expenses for the minor
children.

(See court record at page 107)

for an award of attorney's fees.

The Appellee asked

(See court record at page 106).

The Affidavit of Appellee included copies of letters sent to
Appellant requesting reimbursement for the medical and dental
expenses for the minor children. (See court record at pages 105,
104, 103 and 102.)
No responsive pleading was made by the Appellant prior to
the hearing.
The matter came on as for hearing on June 29, 2001 and the
Appellee provided testimony to the trial court and both counsel
made arguments and proffers to the trial court.

(See trial court

record at page 149, which is the transcript of the hearing and
specifically the transcript at pages 19 and 20, which contain the
testimony of the Appellee.)
Although the Appellant failed to file responsive pleadings
prior to the hearing, such as an affidavit in response, the
court did hear the arguments of both counsel regarding the issues
before the Court.
The Appellant's position regarding the request for a
3

judgment for orthodontic costs was that unless braces wer e
medically necessary, the Appellant should not be required to pay
for one-half of the costs and had refused to do so.
transcript of hearing at page 7,

(See

lines 18 and 19 .)

The Appellant never requested an evidentiary hearing, he
only stated that unless an evidentiary hearing establishes that.
the treatment was medical ly necessary, rather than cosmetic, the
Appellant would not be required to pay for bxaces. (See
transcript at page 7, lines 15-19)
An Order on Order to Show Cause was th-ui signed by the Court
on October 1, 2001.

(See court record at pages 137, 136, 135 and

134.)
The Order on Order to Show Cause granted the Appellee a
judgment in Lli*-1 ctnuHiiil nf $2,7ft0.75 as for orthodontia and
$337.50 as for counseling costs, a judgment in the amount :U
$244.7 5 as fM' attorney's fees and denied the Appellee's request
for a judgment for insurance costs. ( See court i.ecorcl ,il pane
136) .

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Regardless of when the Utah Code was amended the trial court
did not abuse it's discretion when it issued a ruling as to
insurance costs because the Appellee's Motion was denied d.u ;
4

Appellant had no motion before the Court for costs.

The trial court did not abuse it's discretion when it
entered an order granting judgment as for medical expenses
because the Appellee had made a written request to be reimbursed
for the cost of orthodontia, but the Appellant felt orthodontia
was not a

necessary medical expense.

The trial court did not abuse it's discretion when it
awarded attorney's fees to the Appellee because the Appellee
prevailed at the hearing because. The award was within the sound
discretion of the trial court.

ARGUMENT
1 INSURANCE COSTS: The issue of insurance is that the
Appellee requested a judgment for insurance costs. The request
was denied. The Appellant had no motion for a judgment before the
trial court and therefore, it is a moot point that the Appellee
did not receive a judgment for insurance costs because she has
not filed an appeal.
2. MEDICAL EXPENSES: The issue of the judgment for medical
expenses is that the Appellant appeared before the trial court
and stated that he objected to paying for orthodontia because it
was not a medical necessity, but a cosmetic treatment (see
5

transcript at page "', lines 4, 5, 12, 13,

18 and 19 ). Appellant

compared braces to obtaining breast enlargement and stated, that
it just was not "'medically necessary".

(See transcript at page

8, lines 23, 24 arid 25).
The claims of the Appellant in the appeal ai e that the
medical expenses were not substantiated by evidence. However,
that claim is not supported by the evidence in t lie- file. The
Appellee's affidavit contained four separate letters that
informed the Appellant ui the costs for medical expenses.

(See

Court record at pages 105, 104, 103 and 102.) In addition, the
Appellant admitted that I, had visited with the children's
orthodontic surgeon, was aware of the costs and determined that
because they were cosmetic that he declined to pay for the
braces.

(See transcript at page 26, line 14).

The evidence presented at the hearing was that the Appellant
did not agree with the nature . I I he medical treatment provided,
(braces for the chi Idren) .
but even with the -dl^i \

He did request evi dence of the costs,
jr^-jr]^ the evidence of costs, it

remained his contention that the braces were not a medical
necessity.
The trial court found the orthodontia to b>' medically
necessary, and specifically found that the minor children would
be "hindered in their lite by not ha viuq
6

NIH ,Ytnodontia at this

point". See transcript at page 21, lines 17-24.)
No case law was found by Appellee to support the Appellant's
contention that he had the authority to approve or deny braces
for his children.

In addition, the Appellant cited to no case

law in his brief in which the Appellant cited to any case or code
that indicated that Appellant had the authority to make the
determination that braces were not a medical expense.
case of

In the

Beardall v Beardall, 629 P.2d 425, (1981) the Court

examined the issue of the nature of what is a necessary medical
expense and found that "The trial court, sitting as a court of
equity, pertaining to it's powers concerning obligation arising
under a decree of divorce exercised it's equitable powers and
limited defendant's liability to the cost of the insurance
premiums rather than ordering defendant to discharge the entire
obligation for medical expenses in the sum of $3,395.24. Within
this context, the trial court correctly ruled that the premiums
were actually a medical expense for the children".

(See case

attached in the addendum ). The case states clearly that a trial
court may determine whether or not something (such as
orthodontia) is a medical expense necessary to the children.
The Appellee complied with U.C.A. § 78-45-7.15(7) wherein
she not only wrote the Appellant four letters informing him of
the costs (Court file at pages 105, 104, 103 and 102), the
7

record shows that the Appellant actually visited with the doctor
and made the determination that braces were recommended but he
later stated that he would not pay for them. (Transcript at page
26, line 24).
In this case, the trial court heard the arguments of both
parties and properly ruled that braces are a medical expense for
the minor children.
The Appellant's claim (Brief at page 14) that the Appellee
did not provide proof regarding the claimed expenses until
September, 2002 is irrelevant to the issue on appeal. While it
may be relevant to any claim that the Appellant may have to avoid
the enforcement of the judgment, it does not render the order of
the court invalid or subject to appeal.

The Order on Order to

Show Cause, at paragraph 1, grants the judgment, subject to
verification of costs.

(Court file at page 136). If every order

of a divorce court could be overturned because at some point
following the issuance of the order, one of the parties did not
act as ordered, there would be very few orders that would not be
subject to appeal.
The trial court's factual determinations are clearly
erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight of
the evidence. State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d 1268, 1271-72 (Utah App.
1990). The clear evidence in this case is that the Appellant
elected not to pay any portion of the orthodontia and the court
8

did not agree with his position.
3. ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARD: The attorney's fees award was
also within the sound discretion of trial court. In Beardall v.
Beardall 629 P. 2d. 425 (1981), the Defendant claimed that there
was no evidence adduced as to the need of the Plaintiff regarding
attorney's fees. In Beardall the Plaintiff was compelled to
prosecute the hearing in order to enforce the medical expenses
provision of the decree and the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
award of fees.
In this case, the Appellant absolutely refused to pay for
any portion of the orthodontia needs of the minor children
because he felt they were akin to breast implants. (Transcript,
page 8, lines 23, 24, 25.)

That refusal on the part of the

Appellant was the factor that: forced Appellee to file a request
for judgment with the trial court and thus, can be the basis for
an award of attorney's fees and costs.
CONCLUSION
The request for a judgment for insurance costs was denied
and Appellee did not appeal that decision.
The award of a judgment for
fees

medical expenses and attorney's

was within the sound discretion of the trial court and the

prayer for relief in the appeal should be denied.
The Appellee should be awarded her attorney's fees and costs

9

in answering the Appellant's brief.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on this

a

day of April, 2003.

t&*-

id Blakeloc
fhey for A p p e l l e e / P e t i t i o n e r
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY

i

On this ( Itday of April, 2003, I served two copies of the
foregoing to Gary Buhler, P.O. Box 2 2 ^ Grantsvil^g, Utah 840290229 via first class mail, pof
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ADDENDUM

11

78-45-7.15. Medical expenses.
(1) The court shall order that insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children be
provided by a parent if it is available at a reasonable cost
(2) In determining which parent shall be ordered to maintain insurance for medical expenses,
the court or administrative agency may consider the:
(a) reasonableness of the cost,
(b) availability of a group insurance policy;
(c) coverage of the policy, and
(d) preference of the custodial parent.
(3) The order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the
premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance
(4) The children's portion of the premium is a per capita share of the premium actually paid
The premium expense for the children shall be calculated by dividing the premium amount by the
number of persons covered under the policy and multiplying the result by the number of children
in the instant case.
(5) The order shall require each parent to share equally all reasonable and necessary
uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and copayments, incurred for the dependent
children.
(6) The parent ordered to maintain insurance shall provide verification of coverage to the
other parent, or to the Office of Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. Section 601 et seq., upon initial enrollment of the dependent children, and thereafter on or
before January 2 of each calendar year The parent shall notify the other parent, or the Office of
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U S C. Section 601 et seq., of
any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 calendar days of the date he first
knew or should have known of the change
(7) A parent who incurs medical expenses shall provide written verification of the cost and
payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 30 days of payment
(8) In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court, a parent incurring medical
expenses may be denied the right to receive credit for the expenses or to recover the other
parent's share of the expenses if that parent fails to comply with Subsections (6) and (7).
History: C 1953, 78-45-7.15, enacted by L. 1994, ch. 118, § 16; 1995, ch. 258, § 14.
Administrative Rules. - This section is implemented by, interpreted by, or cited as authority
for the following administrative rule(s) R527-201.
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Annette K. BEARDALL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Neil J. BEARDALL, Defendant and Appellant
629 P.2tf 425; 1981 Utah LEXIS 7€3
No. 16994
April 23,1981, Filed
Supreme Court of Utah
Richard J. Maughan, Chief Justice, wrote the opinion. I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Richard C. Howe,
Justice, and Dallin H. Oaks, Justice, concurring. Gordon R. Hall, Justice, concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
Print Case

Save Case

Counsel
John C. Backlund, Provo, Utah for Plaintiff.
P. Gary Ferrero, Provo, Utah for Defendant.
Opinion
Opinion by:

MAUGHAN

{629 P.2d 426} Plaintiff initiated this proceeding pursuant to an order to show cause to enforce a provision
in a decree of divorce entered in November, 1968. Thereunder, defendant was ordered "to pay any medical
or dental expenses which may be incurred for medical or dental care of the two minor daughters of the
parties." Upon hearing before the trial court, plaintiff was awarded judgment in the sum of $ 1,184.20.
Defendant appeals challenging the award of two of the components of that sum. The judgment is affirmed.
In this proceeding plaintiff filed an affidavit averring that defendant was in default in the payment of $
3,395.24 for medical, hospital, and dental bills for the minor daughters of the parties. By stipulation the
parties agreed that plaintiff had procured at her own expense medical insurance, which had covered all
the medical expenses except $ 258.88 for doctor bills and $ 73.32 for prescription drugs. The latter
sums had been paid by plaintiff, which defendant agreed he should reimburse. On appeal defendant
concedes plaintiff should have judgment for these expenses.
Over a period of three years plaintiff had paid $ 1,538.12 in premiums for medical insurance, for which
she sought reimbursement The trial court awarded her $ 700 as reimbursement for insurance
premiums. In addition, plaintiff was awarded $ 125.00 for her attorney's fee.
The defendant vigorously contended that the trial court could not order reimbursement for any of the
insurance premiums on the basis of an order issued in 1975. In October 1975, an order to show cause
was issued, averring defendant was in default in the payment of medical bills in the sum of $ 1,378.98.
During the ensuing proceeding, plaintiff sought reimbursement in the sum of $ 135.00 for premiums for
medical insurance paid from September 1974 through October 1975. The court ordered defendant to
pay $ 1,250.00 to a doctor, and $ 45.60 to plaintiff. However, the court denied plaintiff reimbursement
for the insurance premiums. The following was included in the order:

"Defendant not found responsible to provide medical insurance for the two minor daughters of the
parties."
In the present proceeding the trial court stated that technically under the terms of the 1975 order he
could not award plaintiffjudgmentforthe insurance premiums that she had paid. However, he could do
something with respect to defendant's liability to pay the medical bills. The court stated:
"Well, as I indicated, I think that those premiums were actually a necessary medical expense incurred
© 2003 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of the LexisNexis Group. All rights reserved. Use of this product is subject to the restrictions
and terms and conditions of the Matthew Bender Master Agreement.

for the children."
{629 P.2d 427} The trial court limited plaintiffs right to reimbursement of the insurance premiums as a
medical expense to a period of approximately two years (1977 and 1978) and awarded her $ 700.00.
On appeal defendant contends the order requiring defendant to reimburse plaintiff $ 700 for medical
insurance is invalid. First he urges the current order modified the order of 1975, and such modification
cannot be sustained inasmuch as plaintiff failed to prove a substantial change of circumstances. He
further argues that in the absence of proof of change of circumstances, the doctrine of res judicata
applies, since his responsibility to provide medical insurance had been litigated and determined by the
1975 order. Secondly, defendant contends that if the requisite proof were adduced to justify a
modification, such a modification cannot be applied retroactively, which was the effect of the present
order for reimbursement.
Defendant has misconstrued the order of the trial court. Medical and dental expenses in the sum of $
3,395.24 were incurred for the care of the children. Under the decree of divorce, defendant was liable
for this expense. Plaintiff providently procured and paid for medical insurance which covered these
expenses, with the exceptions set forth ante. This medical insurance did not redound to defendant's
benefit and discharge his liability under the decree. The trial court, sitting as a court of equity, pertaining
to its powers concerning obligations arising under a decree of divorcel exercised its equitable powers
and limited defendant's liability to the cost of the insurance premiums rather than ordering defendant to
discharge the entire obligation for medical expenses in the sum of $ 3,395.24. Within this context, the
trial court correctly ruled that the premiums were actually a necessary medical expense for the
children.2
Defendant further contends the award of $ 125.00 attorney's fees to plaintiff cannot be sustained.
Defendant cites and relies on Kerr v. KerrZ wherein this Court stated:
"
Pursuant to statute [ Section 30-3-3, U.C.A., 1953] a court in a divorce proceeding is
empowered to award such sums as will permit the opposing party to bring or defend the action.
The decision to make such an award, together with the amount thereof, rest primarily with the
sound discretion of the trial court. As with the award of alimony, however, an award of attorneys'
fees must rest on the basis of evidence of need and reasonableness."4

Defendant claims there was no evidence adduced as to the need of plaintiff for attorney's fees to
enable her to prosecute this action, or the reasonableness of the amount awarded. The record does
reveal that this proceeding is the third one plaintiff has been compelled to prosecute to enforce the
medical expenses provision in the decree. Although there was no detailed presentation of facts
establishing the usual requisite factors to support an award of attorney's fees, the facts implicit in this
proceeding and the evidence necessarily presented to the trial judge, together with the de minimis
nature of the award constitute a sufficient basis to sustain the trial court's exercise of its discretion
herein.
WE CONCUR: I. Daniel Stewart, Justice, Richard C. Howe, Justice, Dallin H. Oaks, Justice.
Concur
Concur by:

HALL
Dissent

Dissent by:

HALL

HALL, Justice: (Concurring and Dissenting).
I concur with the main opinion except as to its disposition of the issue of attorney's fees.
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{629 P.2d 428} The majority of the Court cites no authority for holding that the requisite evidentiary
basis for an award of attorney's fees may arise by mere implication, or that an award may be made if it
be de minimis. Indeed, it appears that there is none.
An award of attorney's fees must be based upon direct evidence adduced at trial as to: 1) need, 2)
ability to pay, and 3) reasonableness of the fee to be awarded.1 As stated in the case of Butler v.
Butler:2
This court has consistently held that an attorney's fee may not be awarded where there is nothing in the
record to sustain the award either by way of evidence or by stipulation of the parties as to how the court
may fix it.3 [Emphasis added, citations omitted.]

I would vacate the award of attorney's fees.
Footnotes
Footnotes
1

Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303 (1980).

2
The trial judge in the present proceeding was the judge who issued the 1975 order. The judge
stated in reference to this prior order that he did not intend to relieve defendant of liability for all medical
expenses, if plaintiff elected to procure her own medical insurance. The judge commented that what he
had in mind was that it might be cheaper for defendant to pay the medical bills rather than to carry
insurance.
3

Utah, 610 P.2d 1380,1384 (1980).

4

Also see Kallas v. Kallas, Utah, 614 P.2d 641, 646 (1980).

1

Kerr v. Kerr, Utah, 610 P.2d 1380 (1980).

2

23 Utah 2d 259, 461 P.2d 727 (1969).

3
Id. at p. 261. See also, Adams v. Adams, Utah, 593 P.2d 147 (1979); Lincoln Financial Corp. v.
Ferrier, Utah, 567 P.2d 1102 (1977); Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 (1971); John
Deere Company of Moline v. Behling, 26 Utah 2d 30,484 P.2d 170 (1971); Brasher Motor and Finance
Co. v. Anderson, 20 Utah 2d 104,433 P.2d 608 (1967); FMA. Financial Corp. v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah
2d 80,404 P.2d 670 (1965).
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